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Minority Shareholders and Direct Suits in Closely Held 
Corporations Where Derivative Suits Are Impractical: 
Durham v. Durham  
JASON M. TANGUAY∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose A, B, and C are the sole shareholders and directors of a corpo-
ration.  A and B have used corporate funds for their own personal use and 
such use has depleted the corporation’s assets.  C now wishes to com-
mence a legal proceeding to recover the damages.  Should C be forced to 
recover through a derivative suit brought on behalf of the corporation just 
because the depletion of the corporate assets affected all of the sharehold-
ers and not just C?  Not necessarily.   
In Durham v. Durham,1 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire permit-
ted a minority shareholder, in a closely held corporation, to bring a direct 
suit against a corporation’s officers, even though the injury suffered was 
incurred by the entire corporation.  Prior to this decision, New Hampshire 
had only addressed the requirements for bringing a direct suit in a regular, 
or widely held, corporation.2  In allowing the direct suit, the Durham court 
followed a minority view and adopted a standard provided by the Ameri-
can Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance.3  Many 
jurisdictions have declined to take this step.  Rather, those jurisdictions 
insist that shareholders meet derivative pleading requirements set forth by 
their respective state laws, reasoning that such requirements create uni-
formity and predictability essential to corporate decision making.4  In addi-
tion, many of the states that refuse to allow direct suits by a shareholder 
    ∗    J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, 2007. 
 1. 871 A.2d 41 (N.H. 2005). 
 2. See Appeal of Richards, 590 A.2d 586, 590 (N.H. 1991) (only allowing direct suit by minority 
shareholders, “(1) where there is a special duty, such as a contractual duty, between the wrongdoer and 
the shareholder, [or] (2) where the shareholder suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suf-
fered by other shareholders, or by the corporation itself”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See, e.g., Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding 
“[c]ommercial rules should be predictable”); Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 466 (Minn. 
1999) (requiring that shareholders bring a derivative suit because it provides “[a] uniform, fair and 
predictable mechanism for enforcing claims of the corporation”). 
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against a closely held corporation expressly reject the standard provided by 
the ALI.5   
This Note examines both the minority and majority views and justifies 
New Hampshire’s decision to allow minority shareholders to bypass de-
rivative pleading requirements and bring a direct action allowing them to 
recover personally.  This Note further suggests that in the context of 
closely held corporations, direct actions may provide minority shareholders 
their only chance to receive adequate compensation for injuries they have 
suffered.     
The remainder of this Section explains the differences between deriva-
tive and direct suits, as well as differences between widely held and closely 
held corporations.  Part II will set forth the facts, arguments, and holding 
from Durham and explain why that decision was warranted.  Part III will 
discuss cases from jurisdictions which decline to adopt the ALI standard 
and refuse to allow direct actions in closely held corporations.  Part IV will 
provide an analysis of the two conflicting views and suggest that those 
jurisdictions that have rejected the ALI’s proposal should reconsider.  Fi-
nally, Part V will briefly conclude. 
A.  Derivative Suit vs. Direct Suit  
The fundamental difference between a derivative suit and a direct suit 
is that in a derivative suit a plaintiff shareholder brings a claim on behalf of 
the corporation and seeks recovery for the corporation, whereas, in a direct 
suit, the plaintiff shareholder asserts her own cause of action and seeks 
recovery for herself.6  In a typical corporate setting, the board of directors 
initiate or decide whether a corporation should bring a lawsuit to recover 
damages incurred by the corporation.7  However, in certain circumstances, 
minority shareholders can bring a derivative suit against directors who 
have breached their fiduciary duties to a corporation by depleting its assets 
and/or lowering its stock value.  Because a derivative suit is brought by the 
shareholder on behalf of the corporation, any proceeds from the suit are put 
back into the corporate treasury, which benefits the shareholder indirectly 
through an increase in the value of her shares.  Minority shareholders are 
permitted to bring such a suit because if the members of the board are the 
  
 5. See Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 (S.D. 1997) (declining to adopt ALI standard be-
cause it does not consider that “[a] minority shareholder in a close corporation may have different goals 
than a majority”). 
 6. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 387 (2000). 
 7. Id. 
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putative wrongdoers, they would not decide to bring a suit against them-
selves.8  As Gevurtz observes: 
If courts were to leave exclusive control over corporate litigation 
in the hands of the board, then enforcement of the director’s duties 
to the corporation would be confined to those relatively rare cases 
in which the corporation goes broke and a bankruptcy trustee as-
serts the claim, or else there is a change in management and the 
new directors decide the corporation should act.9
Although the derivative suit provides injured minority shareholders 
some form of redress, the shareholders usually must conform to statutory 
requirements.  For example, under the New Hampshire Business Corpora-
tion Act, a shareholder cannot commence a derivative suit until “a written 
demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action,” and 
either the demand is rejected or ninety days have passed since the demand 
was first made.10
Other circumstances exist where a shareholder may be permitted to 
bring a direct action against the directors, which allows her to recover per-
sonally for damages.  However, this usually requires the shareholder to 
show an injury that is separate from that which was incurred by the entire 
corporation.11  This situation most often occurs when a majority share-
holder breaches a shareholder’s agreement or commits fraud by misleading 
a shareholder to buy or sell stock.12  Direct actions are also allowed when a 
shareholder asserts that an officer or director interfered with her rights as a 
shareholder.13   
The Durham court explains:  
Courts generally require a shareholder to bring a derivative, as op-
posed to a direct, suit against corporate officers to redress injuries 
to the corporation because the derivative proceeding:  
  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.42 (1999). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Nuveen Fund Litig., 855 F.Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying a direct suit 
by shareholders where new shares were offered to existing shareholders, diluting the value of all shares, 
because “the injury to each shareholder [was] of the same character”) (citations and quotations omit-
ted); Appeal of Richards, 590 A.2d 586, 590 (N.H. 1991) (stating that shareholders could not bring a 
direct suit because of a diminution in stock value, due to an inadequate rate increase for customers, 
because such an injury is not distinguishable from that suffered by all shareholders); Loewen v. Galli-
gan, 882 P.2d 104, 112 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (denying direct suit by shareholders after merger dimin-
ished value of their stock because they had suffered no “special” injury).  
 12. GEVURTZ, supra note 6, at 389. 
 13. See Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 268 (2d Cir. 1971) (allowing a direct suit 
where minority shareholder claimed that his ability to control the corporation through voting rights was 
diluted). 
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[1] prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by shareholders; [2] protects 
corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of the recovery back in 
the corporation; [3] protects the interests of all shareholders by in-
creasing the value of their shares, instead of allowing a recovery 
by one shareholder to prejudice the rights of others not a party to 
the suit; and [4] adequately compensates the injured shareholder by 
increasing the value of his shares.14  
Although the courts generally require derivative suits, it is clear why 
shareholders would rather bring direct suits.  As noted above, unlike a di-
rect suit, a derivative suit requires that the shareholder comply with plead-
ing requirements, such as written demands and waiting periods.  Direct 
suits also allow the injured shareholder to recover personally, rather than 
have the proceeds go back into the corporate treasury.  In addition, defen-
dant directors and officers involved in a derivative suit can dispose of such 
suits through the use of special litigation committees, whereas defendants 
in a direct suit are not afforded such protections.15
B.  Widely Held Corporation vs. Closely Held Corporation 
In some states, direct actions are permitted in closely held corporations 
even where the shareholder did not suffer a unique injury.16  Closely held 
corporations are commonly defined as those with shares that are not pub-
licly traded and have only a few shareholders, all or a majority of whom 
participate in the management of the corporation.17  This definition varies 
slightly among the states, as courts have adopted various tests to determine 
whether a corporation is closely held.18  The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire has not adopted a concrete test to identify closely held corpora-
tions.  However, the court has recognized that a typical closely held corpo-
ration is one where “the shareholders are few in number, know each other, 
and actively serve in the management of the business as officers or direc-
tors.”19   
In some states, legislation has also played a role in defining closely 
held corporations, as many have adopted statutes pertaining to such corpo-
  
 14. 871 A.2d 41, 45 (N.H. 1991) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 15. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or “What’s a Lawsuit Be-
tween Friends in an Incorporated Partnership?,” 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1996). 
 16. GEVURTZ, supra note 6, at 388. 
 17. Baruch Gitlin, Annotation, When is Corporation Close, or Closely-Held, Corporation Under 
Common or Statutory Law, 111 A.L.R.5TH 207, 217-18 (2004). 
 18. For a comparison of these various tests, consult id. at 218-22. 
 19. Durham, 871 A.2d at 45 (citing Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 13 n.15 (S.D. 1997)). 
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rations.20  Some of these statutes set forth requirements that must be met in 
order for a corporation to qualify as being closely held, then provide vari-
ous provisions applicable only to closely held corporations, often resulting 
in “flexibility in corporate governance . . . .  Many statutes also provide an 
increased degree of protection for minority stockholders in close corpora-
tions.”21  Other states’ laws have recognized the needs of closely held cor-
porations by integrating provisions into their general corporation laws that 
are only applicable to corporations that do not publicly trade their shares.22
Regardless of how a closely held corporation is defined, its characteris-
tics have led many courts and commentators to analogize such corporations 
to partnerships.23  The reason many courts allow shareholders in these 
“partnership-like” relationships to bring direct suits is that the reasons for 
requiring derivative suits, stated earlier in this Section, are not applicable.24  
Still, most jurisdictions do not accept this reasoning; rather, they insist that 
corporations are distinct from partnerships and, therefore, should be sub-
ject to derivative pleading requirements.25  In Durham, the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire rejected that view.  
II. DURHAM V. DURHAM 
A.  Facts 
The plaintiff, Roland Durham, was one of four shareholders of a New 
Hampshire corporation which owned and operated a camp.26  Roland 
owned forty percent of the corporation’s shares, while the other three 
shareholders, defendants, Peter Durham, Gary Durham, and Martha Styler, 
  
 20. Gitlin, supra note 17, at 217.  Some commentators are of the opinion that closely held corpora-
tion statutes are ineffective.  See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in 
the United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 702 (1989) (concluding that “special close corporation legisla-
tion has not been successful”). 
 21. Gitlin, supra note 17, at 217.  New Hampshire is not among the states that provide such statutes.  
 22. Id.  
 23. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512, 515 (Mass. 
1975) (holding that “[m]any close corporations are really partnerships, between two or three people 
who contribute their capital, skills, experience and labor,” and further holding that “stockholders in the 
close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter-
prise that partners owe to one another”) (citations, quotations, and footnotes omitted); Kleinberger & 
Bergmanis, supra, note 15, at 1205 (stating “modern corporate law has come to recognize, for many 
purposes a close corporation amounts to an ‘incorporated partnership’”). 
 24. GEVURTZ, supra note 6, at 388-89. 
 25. See, e.g., Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding 
“[c]ommercial rules should be predictable”); Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 466 (Minn. 
1999) (requiring that shareholders bring a derivative suit because it provides “[a] uniform, fair and 
predictable mechanism for enforcing claims of the corporation”). 
 26. Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 43 (N.H. 2005). 
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each owned twenty percent of the shares.27  All four shareholders were 
directors of the corporation and, additionally, the three defendants acted as 
officers.28  However, despite the fact that Roland was a director and owned 
forty percent of the corporation’s shares, the defendants excluded him from 
managerial decision making.29
For over twenty-five years, the camp rented cabins and cottages at 
market rates to families for camping.30  Since 2000, Gary used two of the 
camp’s cabins as his full-time residence; however, he did not pay rent to 
the corporation.31  Martha and Peter also used cottages during the summer, 
for their own personal use, without paying a rental fee to the corporation.32  
Besides using the camp for personal use, the defendants also rented cabins 
to friends at “substantially below-market rates.”33   
Roland brought claims alleging that “[t]he corporation’s financial re-
serves [were] reduced by approximately $17,600 since July 2000.”34  Ad-
ditionally, Roland alleged that the defendants “failed to protect the camp’s 
lake shore land, . . . permitted illegal tree cutting on the property and . . . 
failed to maintain adequate insurance on the property.”35   
B.  Procedural History 
Roland brought direct claims against the defendants, for unlawful dis-
tributions and breach of fiduciary duties.36  The trial court found that Ro-
land “did not allege that the defendants owed him any special duty and that 
[he] did not suffer any injuries separate from those suffered by the corpora-
tion” and dismissed Roland’s claims for failure to state a claim and for lack 
of standing to sue.37  Because the depletion of corporate funds had a nega-
tive impact on the entire corporation, “[t]he trial court applied the general 
rule that corporate claims are to be prosecuted either by the corporation or 
derivatively, but not through direct action by a shareholder.”38
  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  Roland served as president of the corporation for four years before being voted out and 
replaced by Gary in July 2004.  Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  Roland had the option to use one cabin for personal use; however, this was of almost no 
value to him since he resided in the town where the camp was located.  Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  Roland’s petition also requested access to corporate records and an accounting, and alleged 
willful and wanton conduct.  Id.   
 37. Id. at 43-44.  
 38. Id. at 44 (quotations omitted). 
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C.  Arguments 
On appeal, the defendants maintained that Roland did not properly 
bring a derivative suit under the New Hampshire Business Corporation 
Act,39 which requires a written demand and waiting period.  The defen-
dants also argued that the shareholder did not meet the requirements to 
bring a direct action under Appeal of Richards40 because the injury that 
Roland suffered (depletion of corporate funds) was not distinct from that 
suffered by the entire corporation.41   
Richards is distinguishable from Durham, however, as the former in-
volved a widely held corporation.  In Richards, the New Hampshire Public 
Utilities Commission approved a rate plan that would govern rate increases 
for the Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH), a widely held 
corporation.42  One group of appealing shareholders argued that the rate 
increases were too low and, therefore, “they [were] injured, in that the 
value of their PSNH stock [had been] decreased.”43  The shareholders 
brought a direct suit challenging the decision of the Public Utilities Com-
mission.44  In addressing the direct suit, the court held that a shareholder 
may “sue in his individual capacity, (1) where there is a special duty, such 
as a contractual duty, between the wrongdoer and the shareholder, [or] (2) 
where the shareholder suffered an injury separate and distinct from that 
suffered by other shareholders, or by the corporation itself.”45  The Rich-
ards court held that the shareholders could not bring a direct claim because 
a diminution in stock value is an injury shared by the corporation itself and 
all of its shareholders.46         
Despite the derivative pleading requirements and the holding from 
Richards, Roland Durham argued that “practical and policy reasons justify 
allowing a direct, as opposed to derivative, action against the defendants 
because the plaintiff is the sole aggrieved shareholder and is suing all the 
remaining shareholders.”47  This argument identified the distinction be-
tween Roland’s situation as a shareholder of a closely held corporation and 
  
 39. See supra Part I.  
 40. 590 A.2d 586 (N.H. 1991). 
 41. Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 44 (N.H. 2005). 
 42. 590 A.2d at 588. 
 43. Id. at 590. 
 44. Id.  On appeal, the shareholders also attempted to bring a suit on behalf of PSNH; however, the 
court did not address their ability to do so because they failed to name PSNH as a party.  See id. (citing 
Kidd. v. N.H. Traction Co., 56 A. 465, 469 (N.H. 1903), which required that a corporation be named as 
a party to bring a derivative action). 
 45. Richards, 590 A.2d at 590 (citations omitted). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 44 (N.H. 2005). 
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that of the plaintiff-shareholder in the Richards case, which involved a 
widely held corporation whose shares were publicly traded. 
D.  Court’s Analysis and Holding 
The Durham court agreed with Roland.48  It first acknowledged three 
ways in which a corporation can obtain relief from its injuries: (1) the 
board of directors may bring a suit on behalf of the corporation; (2) a 
shareholder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation; and 
(3) a shareholder may bring a direct suit, on her own behalf, if she can 
meet one of the two requirements set forth in Richards.49  In response to 
the defendants’ argument that Roland was required to bring a derivative 
action, the court reviewed the relevant derivative pleading requirements, 
including a written demand and a ninety day waiting period.50  It recog-
nized that in situations such as these, derivative pleading requirements 
were futile and burdensome.51  The court noted that it would have been 
impracticable for Roland to have made a written demand asking the board 
to bring an action on behalf of the corporation because there were no disin-
terested directors on the board.52       
In addressing the possibility of bringing a direct suit, the Durham court 
noted that courts generally require derivative suits because they: (1) pre-
vent multiple lawsuits; (2) protect corporate creditors; (3) protect the inter-
ests of all shareholders, rather than just the shareholder bringing the claim; 
and (4) protect the shareholder bringing the suit through an increase in the 
value of her shares.53  The court then recognized that these principles are 
not always applicable to a closely held corporation “because such corpora-
tions have a small number of shareholders and there is significant overlap 
between the ownership and management of the corporation.”54  As an ex-
ample, the court observed that in the situation at hand, “a multiplicity of 
suits is unlikely” where all interested persons are parties in the suit.55   
Next, the court acknowledged the difficulty in determining whether a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation should be allowed to bring a di-
rect action.56  As many other jurisdictions have done when faced with this 
  
 48. Id. at 46. 
 49. Id. at 44. 
 50. Id. at 44-45. 
 51. Id. at 46. 
 52. Id. at 45. 
 53. Id.  The actual language used by the court is quoted above in Part I. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
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question, the Durham court sought guidance from the ALI’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance: 
In the case of a closely-held corporation . . ., the court in its discre-
tion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, 
exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to 
derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that 
to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defen-
dants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the inter-
ests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair dis-
tribution of the recovery among all interested persons.57  
The court then noted that these “factors have been criticized . . . for not 
including all relevant considerations in determining whether a suit should 
be direct or derivative.”58
Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to the trial court, giving it 
discretion to allow Roland to bring a direct suit.59  The trial court was in-
structed to “tak[e] into account all of the above factors, including those 
suggested by the ALI” when making its determination.60  In remanding the 
case, the court reasoned that “[t]he derivative/direct distinction makes little 
sense when the only interested parties are two . . . sets of shareholders, one 
who is in control and the other who is not.  In this context, the debate . . . 
can become purely technical.”61  It further reasoned that “[i]n cases such as 
this one . . . the principles underlying the derivative proceeding are not 
served.”62   
The court gave the trial court some guidance in making its determina-
tion by stating that “[a] direct action may be appropriate in this case be-
cause all of the corporation’s shareholders are before the court . . .; thus, 
there is no risk [of exposure] . . . to a multiplicity of actions.”63  The court 
further noted that there are no disinterested board members that could de-
termine whether a derivative suit would be in the corporation’s best inter-
est.64  Finally, it cautioned the trial court to consider “whether any of the 
  
 57. Id. (quoting 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d), at 17 (1994)).  
 58. Id. at 46.  Those jurisdictions which have criticized the ALI standard and refuse to allow direct 
suits in closely held corporations without showing distinct injury will be discussed in detail in Part III. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
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corporation’s creditors would be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to 
pursue a direct action against the defendants.”65  
E.  Comment on Durham 
The Durham court’s decision is justified considering the distinction be-
tween Richards and Durham.  In agreeing with Roland, the court did not 
have to overrule Richards or the requirements to bring a direct suit pro-
vided by Richards.  Rather, the court made an important distinction be-
tween Richards, which dealt with a widely held corporation, and Durham, 
which involved a closely held corporation.  This distinction is crucial to the 
issue regarding direct versus derivative suits because in many situations 
involving closely held corporations “the principles underlying the deriva-
tive proceeding are not served.”66   
The factual circumstances of the Durham case support the court’s con-
clusion that derivative suits become less sensible when dealing with only a 
few shareholders.  First, the derivative pleading requirements set forth by 
section 293-A:7.42 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, 
required the plaintiff, Roland Durham, to make a written demand upon the 
corporation to take action, then wait until either his demand was rejected 
by the board or ninety days passed before bringing a derivative suit on 
behalf of the corporation.  This requirement allowed the board of directors 
to decide whether a legal proceeding against the alleged wrongdoers was in 
the best interest of the corporation and gave the corporation an opportunity 
to bring the action itself.  However, in Durham, the board of directors con-
sisted only of Roland and the three defendants, Peter Durham, Gary Dur-
ham, and Martha Styer.  It was not very likely that the three defendants 
would have voted in favor of bringing a lawsuit against themselves had 
Roland made a written demand and, thus, no purpose would have been 
served in making him do so.   
Second, the reasons that courts generally require derivative suits are 
undermined when applied to the circumstances of the Durham case.  The 
first of these reasons is to avoid subjecting defendants to multiple law-
suits.67  In Durham all four shareholders, which included the entire board 
of directors and all of the officers, were all involved in the lawsuit.  Thus, 
there were no other shareholders who could have surfaced after the lawsuit 
to bring the same action against the defendants.   
  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 45. 
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Another argument supporting derivative suits is that they protect the 
interests of all shareholders instead of allowing recovery to one share-
holder which may affect the rights of others who are not party to the law-
suit.68  As noted above, all of the shareholders in Durham were named as 
parties to the lawsuit.  Accordingly, there were no other shareholders that 
had an interest in the damages that the plaintiff sought to recover person-
ally. 
Courts also reason that a derivative suit “adequately compensates the 
injured shareholder by increasing the value of his shares.”69  Allowing 
Roland to bring a direct suit and recover the damages directly, rather than 
through an increase in the value of his shares, does adequately compensate 
him.  Indeed, Part IV of this Note suggests that allowing the direct suit may 
be the only way to adequately compensate him.  
The final reason that courts generally require a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action is that it protects the corporation’s creditors by putting the 
proceeds back into the corporate treasury and, therefore, within the reach 
of such creditors.70  The Durham case provided no information relating to 
the corporation’s creditors; however, the court did recognize this as a valid 
concern and protected potential creditors’ rights by cautioning the trial 
court to consider this issue on remand.71
This reasoning compelled the Durham court to accept the standard set 
forth by the ALI and instruct the trial court to consider such factors when 
determining whether a direct suit is appropriate.72  The factors suggested 
by the ALI adequately address the concerns expressed earlier by courts that 
require derivative suits; in fact, much of the language used by the ALI al-
most mirrors that used by the courts.73  However, as mentioned above, the 
Durham court’s view is not shared by all.  While the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire has accepted the ALI standard, many other jurisdictions 
reject that standard and refuse to acknowledge an exception for closely 
held corporations.74   
  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 46. 
 73. To compare the courts’ argument supporting a preference for derivative actions with the ALI 
standard for determining whether a direct suit is appropriate, consult supra Parts I-II.   
 74. Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 46 (N.H. 2005). 
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III. REJECTING THE ALI STANDARD 
As noted in Durham, those jurisdictions that continue to require de-
rivative suits even when dealing with closely held corporations “generally 
do so to promote consistency and predictability in corporate law.”75  In 
addition, other jurisdictions decline to adopt the ALI standard arguing that 
it does not adequately address the reasons that courts generally require 
derivative suits.76  Overall, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire’s deci-
sion to adopt this standard is of the minority view.77   
A.  Need for Consistency and Predictability  
Some courts, in an effort to promote predictability within their corpo-
rate laws, insist that regardless of its characteristics, a closely held corpora-
tion is nonetheless still a corporation.  In Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc.,78 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined whether a minority shareholder’s claim was direct or derivative for 
the purpose of establishing diversity.79  The plaintiff, Bagdon, who man-
aged a Firestone auto center, and the defendant Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. 
were the only two shareholders of this closely held corporation, owning 
forty-nine percent and fifty-one percent respectively.80  Bridge-
stone/Firestone opened a new auto center that competed with the original 
center owned by itself and the plaintiff, resulting in a loss of business for 
the original center.81  Bagdon alleged that, among other things, Bridge-
stone/Firestone “violated the duty a controlling shareholder owes to the 
corporation, and derivatively to the minority investors.”82  Although the 
alleged injury only affected Bagdon indirectly through the loss to the cor-
poration, he nonetheless argued that a direct suit should be permitted be-
cause the corporation was closely held.83  
Applying Delaware law, the court declined to make an exception for 
closely held corporations.84  First, the court acknowledged the general rule 
in Delaware that an injury inflicted through the corporation must be re-
  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 15, at 1266. 
 78. 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 79. Id. at 380-81. 
 80. Id. at 380.  Many of the auto centers were separately incorporated in this manner in order to 
motivate the managers to succeed and strengthen their loyalty to the company.  Id. 
 81. Id.  This was only detrimental to Bagdon because Bridgestone/Firestone owned shares in many 
of its auto centers and, therefore, would profit either way. 
 82. Id. at 381. 
 83. Id. at 383-84. 
 84. Id. 
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dressed through a derivative suit.  However, the court also noted that a 
“special injury” exception to this rule allows a shareholder to bring a direct 
suit where the injury is distinct and disproportionate to the investor.85  Fi-
nally, it rejected the minority view, shared by the ALI, which “has ex-
panded the ‘special injury’ doctrine into a general exception for closely 
held corporations, treating them as if they were partnerships.”86  The court 
reasoned that “[c]orporations are not partnerships” and further stated: 
Whether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities. 
Commercial rules should be predictable; this objective is best 
served by treating corporations as what they are, allowing the in-
vestors and other participants to vary the rules by contract if they 
think deviations are warranted.87
In conclusion, the court cited Delaware case law in support of its holding.88  
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also chose uniformity and predict-
ability in Wessin v. Archives Corp.89  In Wessin, the minority shareholders 
brought several direct claims, including breach of fiduciary duties through 
fraud, misrepresentation, and waste of corporate funds, alleging that the 
defendants used corporate assets for personal use.90  The defendants ar-
gued that the claims should have been brought derivatively and subject to 
the requirements of Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 23.06, which pro-
vided in pertinent part: 
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the di-
rectors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the share-
holders, ***, and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort.91
The court held that all of the plaintiffs’ claims were derivative, reason-
ing that the injuries were not incurred solely by the plaintiffs, but rather, 
were suffered by the entire corporation.92  Nonetheless, the plaintiffs urged 
  
 85. Id. at 383. 
 86. Id. at 383-84. 
 87. Id. at 384 (emphasis in original). 
 88. Id.  The court cites two cases: Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473 (Del. Ch. 1951), where 
minority shareholders were required to bring a derivative suit after the value of their shares diminished 
when the controlling shareholder transferred assets for inadequate value, and Abelow v. Symonds, 156 
A.2d 416 (Del. Ch. 1959), where minority shareholders of a closely held corporation were again re-
quired to bring a derivative suit after a ninety-five percent stockowner proposed to liquidate at a price 
thought to be inadequate. 
 89. 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999). 
 90. Id. at 462-63. 
 91. Id. at 464 (quoting former MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06, renumbered MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.09 in 2005). 
 92. Id. at 465. 
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the court to adopt the ALI’s rule and allow them to bypass the derivative 
pleading requirements because they were shareholders of a corporation 
which Minnesota statute defined as closely held.93  The court rejected this 
request along with the assertion that derivative suits in this context were 
pointless because the proceeds are returned to the hands of the alleged 
wrongdoers.94  Rather, the court maintained that “a closely held corpora-
tion is still a corporation with all of the rights and limitations proscribed by 
legislature.”95  It then followed the same formulaic approach as the Bagdon 
court, and quoted Bagdon in holding that “[c]orporations are not partner-
ships.”96  The Wessin court also added that, “[a] uniform, fair and predict-
able mechanism for enforcing claims of the corporation is important for the 
corporation and all of the shareholders.”97  Finally, it offered a policy 
based argument that the derivative pleading requirements encourage com-
munication among the leaders of a corporation before utilizing the court 
system.98
B.  Alleged Inadequacy of the ALI Standard 
Other courts contend that the ALI standard is flawed.  In Landstrom v. 
Shaver,99 the Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected a shareholder’s plea 
to adopt the ALI standard and provided reasons beyond a mere need for 
predictability.100  There, a minority shareholder brought a direct suit 
against the remaining few shareholders of a closely held corporation, alleg-
ing, among other claims, shareholder oppression and breach of fiduciary 
duties that led to a diminution in stock value.101  The court wasted no time 
in establishing that “[d]iminution in the value of stock is a loss that is sus-
tained by all shareholders and thus subject to the derivative action re-
  
 93. Id. at 466.  “Minnesota Statutes section 302A.011, subd. 6a (1998) defines a closely held corpo-
ration as ‘a corporation which does not have more than 35 shareholders.’”  Id. at 466 n.1 (emphasis in 
original). 
 94. Id. at 466. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 467.  The Wessin court did not need to take this hard-line approach and expressly rejected 
the proposed exception for closely held corporations.  Even if the court had applied the ALI standard, 
the minority shareholders’ claims would have likely failed anyway since the plaintiffs represented only 
“some” of the minority shareholders.  Id. at 462.  The ALI suggests, among other factors, that a direct 
suit should only be permitted where it does not “interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among 
all interested persons.”  See supra Part II.  Having found that the plaintiffs’ claims were derivative in 
nature, the court could have simply dismissed the direct suit on these grounds by noting that other 
shareholders, not named in the lawsuit, might be denied their rights to the proceeds. 
 99. 561 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1997). 
 100. Although much of the court’s analysis of the ALI’s proposed rule involved a critique of the rule 
itself, it did quote language from Bagdon expressing concerns for predictability.  Id. at 14. 
 101. Id. at 3. 
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quirement,” and further provided the reasons courts generally require de-
rivative actions.102
The court, nonetheless, addressed the proposed ALI exception, observ-
ing the potential abuse by dissenting minority shareholders who might 
bring direct suits because of mere differences of opinions with majority 
shareholders.103  One example the court provided was “[a] dispute over 
maximization of short-term profits as against the long-term financial health 
and growth of the corporation.”104  It then suggested that this abuse might 
place an undue financial burden on corporations, which would be espe-
cially detrimental in South Dakota given the considerable number of small 
corporations.105
The Landstrom court also criticized the ALI’s proposed exception as-
serting that it fails to consider each of the four reasons that courts generally 
require derivative actions.106  Specifically, the court was concerned that the 
ALI standard did not “address whether a derivative suit [could] suffice to 
adequately compensate the injured shareholder” and further noted that this 
should be considered, given that it is the ultimate goal of the plaintiff.107    
Before dismissing the ALI proposal altogether, the court went on to 
apply the ALI standard to the circumstances surrounding the Landstrom 
case.108  It conceded there was no chance of exposure to a multiplicity of 
actions; however, it also observed the likelihood of injury to corporate 
creditors given the corporation’s financial status at the time.109  Next, the 
court criticized the trial court’s reasoning that “requiring a derivative ac-
tion might [have] result[ed] in an unfair distribution of the recovery among 
all interested persons.”110  The trial court was concerned that if proceeds 
were returned to the corporation to increase the value of its shares, the al-
leged wrongdoers would benefit along with the injured minority share-
holder.111  The Landstrom court clarified the issue by explaining that the 
defendants receive no windfall since the proceeds come from their pockets 
in the first place, thus, it does not matter that the value of their own shares 
increase along with those of the plaintiff.112  The court concluded its analy-
sis of the ALI standard by suggesting that the ALI’s proposed rule may 
  
 102. Id. at 12.  For the reasons courts prefer derivative, as opposed to direct actions, consult supra 
Part I. 
 103. Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 13. 
 104. Id. at 13-14. 
 105. Id. at 14 n.16. 
 106. Id. at 14. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 14-15. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 15. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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result in forced buy-outs of the minority shareholders’ shares due to litiga-
tion or in some cases, the mere threat of having to finance a judicial pro-
ceeding.113  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The argument for adopting the ALI rule and allowing direct actions by 
minority shareholders in closely held corporations is that derivative plead-
ing requirements are futile in the context of a close corporation and that the 
reasons that courts generally require derivative actions are addressed by the 
ALI standard.  On the other hand, the majority view is that there is a strong 
need for predictability within the corporate context and that the ALI stan-
dard is not comprehensive enough to adequately address the courts’ con-
cerns.  The Landstrom court also reasoned that the ALI standard creates a 
potential for abuse by minority shareholders.114  While both views have 
merit, in this case, practicality should prevail over predictability and al-
leged inadequacy.  The majority view’s reasons for rejecting the ALI’s 
proposed standard are unconvincing and should be reconsidered by those 
jurisdictions that have outright rejected it; for at least in some cases, it may 
be the fairest solution.       
A.  Potential Abuse by Minority Shareholders 
Adopting the ALI standard will not lead to an increase in claims; 
rather, it will merely change the way in which claims are brought.  The 
Landstrom court expressed concern that the adoption of the ALI standard 
would open the door for any disgruntled minority shareholder to bring a 
suit simply because she has different objectives than the majority.115  How-
ever, the door is already open since disgruntled shareholders can already 
bring derivative suits that may be based on a mere difference in opinion.  
The court further worried that increased litigation could negatively impact 
corporations financially.  While this may be a valid point, it fails to explain 
exactly how allowing direct suits will lead to more litigation or more costly 
litigation than if shareholders were limited to derivative suits.  Although 
derivative pleading requirements provide the board with substantial discre-
tion to reject a demand from a minority shareholder who requests that the 
corporation bring a suit, if the demand is rejected there is often litigation 
over whether the rejection was in good faith or whether the demand can be 
  
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra Part III. 
 115. Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 (S.D. 1997). 
2007 DURHAM v. DURHAM 485 
excused.  Additionally, the determination to reject a demand usually comes 
from a special litigation committee who has spent time investigating the 
matter.  These proceedings all cost the corporation money as well.  More-
over, these disputes often arise where the majority of the board is not disin-
terested, which is a setting familiar to disputes within closely held corpora-
tions.116  
Legislation could also play a role in preventing the abuse with which 
the Landstrom court was concerned by providing statutory penalties for 
unjustified claims.  This would discourage minority shareholders from 
bringing suits that would usually be dismissed under the business judgment 
rule.  Indeed, some states have already provided such a penalty for unjusti-
fied derivative claims.117     
B.  Need for Predictability 
The desire for consistent and predictable rules is not irrational because 
such rules put shareholders on notice and, thus, allow them to protect 
themselves from liabilities.  However, the need for predictability is not as 
strong in closely held corporations because of the small numbers of share-
holders and the relationships that usually exist among those shareholders.  
However, jurisdictions such as Delaware and Minnesota dismiss this rea-
soning and instead maintain that “the closely held nature of the corporation 
[is] irrelevant to the distinction between direct and derivative actions.”118  
Rules governing dispute resolution are more important to circum-
stances surrounding a widely held corporation where shareholders are en-
trusting their investment to a board with whom they are not personally 
familiar.  Those directors may need the comfort of being able to predict 
rules.  However, in closely held corporations, the shareholders often “know 
each other,”119 thus, the relationship is more personal and often accompa-
nied by an unspoken expectation that nobody will be wronged by others 
with whom they have entered into a close, albeit business, relationship.  
Furthermore, this relationship, when coupled with the fact that most of 
these shareholders participate in the management of the corporation, dem-
  
 116. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldanado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 
1034 (N.Y. 1996); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). 
 117. New Hampshire has such a statute which provides in pertinent part: “On termination of the 
derivative proceeding the court may . . . order the plaintiff to pay any defendant’s reasonable expenses, 
including counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was com-
menced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose.”  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
293-A:7.46 (1999). 
 118. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations and quota-
tions omitted). 
 119. Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 45 (N.H. 2005).  
486 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 3   
onstrates that shareholders in closely held corporations have more in com-
mon with partners than they do with shareholders of a widely held corpora-
tion.  Treating all corporations the same ignores this reality, which other 
jurisdictions have acknowledged by writing statutes specific to closely held 
corporations and following the Donahue view that shareholders in closely 
held corporations owe duties to each other similar to those present in a 
partnership.120
Consider two hypothetical situations involving a potential defendant, 
“Director.”  In the first situation, Director is considering taking a position 
on the board of “Widely-Held Corp.”  She is comforted to know that any 
minority shareholders who may bring claims against her will likely be 
forced to bring a derivative action, assuming Director’s actions do not spe-
cifically injure an individual shareholder.  Here, Director should be able to 
rely on the protections afforded by a derivative suit since she may need to 
defend herself against an unknown number of shareholders.  In this con-
text, Director should not be automatically subjected to the allegations of 
the potential millions of minority shareholders who may question her 
judgment by allowing them to bypass derivative pleading requirements.   
In the second situation, Director and “Minority” are the sole share-
holders of “Closely Held Corp.,” owning sixty percent and forty percent of 
the corporation’s stock respectively.  Director started the corporation but 
then sold forty percent of her stock to Minority as an investor.  Here, Di-
rector does not have as strong of a need to rely on the protections afforded 
by a derivative suit.  Director knows Minority, who is the only person who 
could potentially bring claims against her for injury to the corporation.  In 
fact, in many situations, Director and Minority are friends or members of 
the same family who intend to act like partners but choose to structure the 
business as a corporation to benefit from limited liability.  This relationship 
reduces the chances that Director will be sued because of actions she has 
taken and, therefore, decreases the need that she be protected by a deriva-
tive suit. 
Regardless of the shareholders’ relationship, using the ALI standard 
will not result in unpredictable corporate laws that deprive shareholders of 
the chance to protect themselves from liabilities.  If a state, such as Minne-
sota, adopted the ALI rule, directors entering into closely held corporations 
would still be able to predict their potential liability; it would just be dif-
ferent than it is at the present time.  For example, all shareholders forming 
a closely held corporation in New Hampshire are now advised that they 
  
 120. See Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (Ind. 1995) (adopting ALI standard in part because 
“shareholders of closely-held corporations have very direct obligations to one another,” and owe each 
other the “utmost good faith and loyalty”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
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can be sued directly by other shareholders if there is no chance of multiple 
suits, thus, creditors are not prejudiced and all interested persons are enti-
tled to a fair distribution of the proceeds.  With such notice, shareholders, 
officers, and directors who find this outcome undesirable can protect them-
selves by privately contracting out of such liability.   
C.  Alleged Inadequacy of the ALI Standard 
There is also little merit to the Landstrom court’s assertion that “[t]he 
ALI rule does not include all relevant considerations.”121  The court’s spe-
cific concern is that the rule “fails to address whether a derivative suit can 
suffice to adequately compensate the injured shareholder.”122  As men-
tioned earlier, courts have generally required derivative actions because 
they prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits, protect creditors, protect the inter-
ests of all shareholders by increasing the value of their shares, and ade-
quately compensate the injured shareholder by increasing the value of his 
shares.123  Meanwhile, the ALI recommends that a direct suit may be 
brought when there is no chance of multiple lawsuits, prejudice to credi-
tors, or interference with a fair distribution to all shareholders.124  Land-
strom points to the ALI’s omission of the fourth reason given by the courts, 
regarding adequate compensation for the injured shareholder. 
The assertion that the ALI rule “fails to address whether a derivative 
suit can suffice to adequately compensate the injured shareholder” makes 
no sense.  The ALI is advocating for direct suits; thus, any concern should 
focus on whether direct suits adequately compensate an injured share-
holder to the same extent that she would recover in a derivative suit.  This 
would have been a valid question, since the other three reasons derivative 
suits are generally required are addressed by the ALI.  However, the obvi-
ous answer to this question likely explains why the ALI did not bother to 
include it in its analysis—of course a direct suit would adequately compen-
sate an injured shareholder by allowing her to recover personally. 
D.  Inadequacy of the Derivative Suit  
The discussion relevant to adequate compensation for the injured 
shareholder actually strengthens the argument for adopting the ALI stan-
dard by exposing the inadequacy of derivative suits in these situations.  
When dealing with closely held corporations, a direct suit may be the only 
  
 121. Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 (S.D. 1997). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Durham, 871 A.2d at 45. 
 124. Id. (citation omitted). 
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way to adequately compensate an injured minority shareholder because the 
shares are usually not publicly traded and, therefore, the shareholder may 
not have the opportunity to sell her shares on the open market.  Ironically, 
this point is best made by Thomas v. Dickson,125 which the Landstrom 
court cites indirectly to support its assertion that the ALI rule “fails to ad-
dress whether a derivative suit can suffice to adequately compensate the 
injured shareholder.”126   
In Thomas, the Supreme Court of Georgia did in fact consider whether 
a derivative suit would adequately compensate the injured shareholder and 
held that it would not.127  There, the court believed that it, along with 
“other state courts should look at the ‘realistic objectives’ of a given case 
to determine if a direct action is proper,” and thus, allowed a plaintiff to 
bring a direct suit where “the reasons underlying the general rule calling 
for corporate recovery [did] not exist.”128  The court then explained why 
each of the reasons that derivative suits are generally required were not 
applicable in that particular case.129  When addressing adequate compensa-
tion for the injured shareholder, the court observed:  
[The plaintiff] would not be adequately compensated by a corpo-
rate recovery.  For a shareholder, the potential benefit of a corpo-
rate recovery in such cases is the increase in the value of his or her 
shares.  There would be no such benefit to [the plaintiff], however, 
since, in a closely held corporation, there is no ready market for 
her shares.130
Once the statement is put into context, the ALI’s omission of the inquiry 
regarding adequate compensation for an injured shareholder in a closely 
held corporation cannot be perceived as a flaw.  If anything, that inquiry 
only strengthens the argument for allowing direct suits in such situations 
by exposing a flaw in the derivative action.  The increase in the value of 
shares may not compensate the injured shareholder where her ability to sell 
those shares, and realize her investment, is contingent on the approval of 
her co-owners. 
  
 125. 301 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1983). 
 126. Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 14.  Landstrom cites a footnote from Kleinberger & Bergmanis, 
which states that “[t]he ALI approach does not encompass all previous rationales,” and further explains 
that the Thomas court “addressed not only the issues considered by the ALI but also whether a deriva-
tive suit would suffice to adequately compensate the injured shareholder.”  Id. (citing Kleinberger & 
Bergmanis, supra note 15, at 1265 n.315). 
 127. 301 S.E.2d at 51. 
 128. Id. (citations omitted). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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The Durham court also acknowledged this potential problem: “[a]ny 
recovery from a derivative proceeding goes to the corporation and thus 
would be under the control of the alleged wrongdoers.”131  In the Durham 
case, a successful derivative suit would have resulted in an increase in the 
value of Roland’s shares; however, he would have been at the mercy of the 
board as to the means by which he could benefit from that investment.  
This is evidenced by the fact that the board had already voted him out as an 
officer and “actively excluded [him] from management of the corpora-
tion.”132
This flaw in the derivative suit greatly weakens the argument by the 
majority view, which declines to adopt the ALI rule under any circum-
stances.  Those courts should not ignore the possibility that forcing a mi-
nority shareholder to bring a derivative suit will likely deny her of the very 
damages she seeks.  In fact, it was the Landstrom court that stressed the 
importance of adequate compensation, “[s]ince that is the ultimate goal 
should the plaintiff prevail on the evidentiary burden.”133     
The courts that refuse to adopt the ALI rule outright, should instead 
consider a conditional adoption of the rule contingent on whether a deriva-
tive  action can adequately compensate the injured shareholder based on 
her ability to receive proceeds.  Landstrom recognized the possibility that 
this trend has already begun: “It would appear that those courts which have 
adopted the ALI rule have done so when faced with claims of fraud or 
freeze-outs.”134  Granted, this may lead to more complicated litigation to 
determine whether in fact a freeze-out has impaired the shareholder’s abil-
ity to benefit from her investment,135 but the effort is justified by the need 
for plaintiffs to achieve their “ultimate goal.”  This exception is further 
justified given the strong likelihood that a minority shareholder in a closely 
held corporation will inevitably face a freeze-out at the commencement of 
her suit, if it has not already occurred.   
  
 131. Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 46 (N.H. 2005). 
 132. Id. at 43. 
 133. Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 (S.D. 1997). 
 134. Id. at 15 n.18. 
 135. For a discussion of freeze-outs and their effects on shareholders of a closely held corporation, 
consult Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st  Cir. 1986).  The Sugarman court held that in order to 
prove a freeze out:  
[T]he minority shareholder must first establish that the majority shareholder employed vari-
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nority.  
Id. at 11 (citation and quotation omitted). 
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E.  Rationality of the ALI Standard 
While adopting the ALI rule conditionally would be a positive first 
step, all jurisdictions should simply adopt the rule outright.  Courts which 
have rejected the rule treat it as if it were “a general exception for closely 
held corporations” where all shareholders in such corporations would be 
permitted to bring a direct suit in any situation.136  This rule would be un-
reasonable and overbroad.  For example, given Minnesota’s statutory defi-
nition of a closely held corporation, shareholders in that State would be 
permitted to bring a direct suit even though there could be over thirty other 
shareholders who could bring multiple suits and would have an interest in 
the same corporate funds that the plaintiff-shareholder sought.137  How-
ever, ALI’s proposal is not that broad; it does not suggest that all closely 
held corporations should be treated as partnerships.   
Adopting the ALI rule does not mean that all shareholders of closely 
held corporations will always be able to bring direct suits.  Adopting the 
rule simply allows courts to use discretion to determine whether the ration-
ales supporting a derivative suit are applicable or if a direct suit is more 
practical and fair.  The rule still allows a court to dismiss a direct suit if 
any of the circumstances that make a direct suit inappropriate are present.  
For example, the Landstrom court did apply the ALI rule to the facts of its 
case even though it rejected the rule outright.138  There, the court noted 
that,  
[g]iven [the corporation’s] recent financial tailspin, the confidence 
of the creditors . . . to survive this condition and meet its financial 
obligations in the future would be best served by paying the mil-
lions awarded as damages, to [the corporation] rather than indi-
vidually to Landstrom.139
In this situation, a court that had adopted the ALI rule could still find that a 
direct suit is not appropriate because the second factor that the ALI rule 
considers is whether any corporate creditors would be prejudiced.140  How-
ever, courts should have the discretion to hold otherwise in cases where 
there are no corporate creditors that would be prejudiced.   
The ALI standard prevents demand futility and allows a frozen-out, 
minority shareholder to recover damages directly when appropriate, but 
also reserves a court’s right to require a derivative suit when a direct suit is 
  
 136. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 137. Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 466 (Minn. 1999). 
 138. Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 14-15. 
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 140. See supra Part II. 
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not appropriate.  This is easily demonstrated by comparing the majority 
view and the ALI standard after removing the substance of the arguments:  
The majority view maintains that although derivative suits are not always 
practical, they should always be required because it is important to prevent 
A, B, and C from occurring.  The ALI rule does not suggest that A, B, and 
C are not important concerns; in fact, the rule acknowledges their impor-
tance by asking, “Is there any chance that A, B, or C will occur?  If not, 
then a direct suit is permissible.”  Thus, the rule provides the best of both 
worlds—the flexibility to require a derivative suit where any of the reasons 
supporting such a suit are applicable, and also, the ability to allow a direct 
suit where such reasons are not applicable and a shareholder would not 
receive adequate compensation if she were unable to recover personally. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While consistency and predictability in corporate law is important, 
courts can better serve the public’s needs when they have the flexibility to 
apply new rules that make sense in a given situation.  The Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire took a seemingly bold step in Durham.  Roland Dur-
ham asked the court to adopt the standard set forth by the ALI that had 
been widely criticized by a majority of the states; and the court did just 
that.  In doing so, the court did not disregard the majority view but, rather, 
it addressed the majority position and then provided its own well-reasoned 
approach to the issue. 
The court, of course, held that minority shareholders, in these situa-
tions, should have the option to bring a direct suit, assuming the ALI stan-
dard has been satisfied.  Perhaps the best response given by the court to 
justify this decision was that requiring a minority shareholder to bring a 
derivative suit “makes little sense.”141  The court simply chose practicality 
over predictability.  The court reasoned that derivative pleading require-
ments serve no purpose where the demand to bring a suit will be made to 
the alleged wrongdoers.  This makes sense given the strong unlikelihood 
that a majority shareholder would decide to sue herself.  Thus, in the con-
text of the closely held corporation, where all shareholders are interested 
parties, the demand requirement only burdens the already wronged minor-
ity shareholder and allows the majority shareholder an extra ninety days to 
continue violating her fiduciary duties.   
Besides the futility of pleading requirements, the impracticality of the 
derivative suit itself should also be clear in this context.  It “makes little 
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sense” to worry about a multiplicity of suits where all shareholders are 
already parties to the suit.142  It “makes little sense” to worry about protect-
ing the interests of all the shareholders.  Again, they’re all involved in the 
suit.  It “makes little sense” to worry about whether the minority share-
holder will be adequately compensated.  Few situations, if any, exist where 
a minority shareholder, especially one who is inevitably facing a freeze-
out, would not be adequately compensated by recovering directly rather 
than having the value of her shares increased.  While it does make sense to 
worry about creditor’s rights, the ALI standard already provides for this 
consideration.   
The ALI, and states such as New Hampshire that have adopted its 
standard, have provided a fair and reasonable common law solution to ac-
commodate needs that were not considered when corporate laws were 
drafted.  Furthermore, an adoption of the ALI standard does not undermine 
any of the reasons the courts generally require a derivative suit.  So in ret-





 142. The Landstrom court acknowledges that “[t]his apparently is a common occurrence in ALI 
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